Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1948

Wilbur Burnham, Charles L. Burnham, Frances L.
Mayo, Kenneth A. Luckey, and Walker Bank &
Trust Company v. Leta B. Eschler : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Burnham v. Eschler, No. 7209 (Utah Supreme Court, 1948).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/933

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

- ----- ------7209___ _
Case No. 7209 ·

0

.:~ THE SUPREME COURT

·

of the State of Utah

WILBUR BURNHAM, CHARLES L. ·
'BIJmmAM,FRANCES L. MAYO,.
KENNETH A. LUCKEY, and
WAI,KER BANK.& ·TRUST COM- .
PANY, a.oorporation, as administrator
of the estate of -JENNIE B. SCHANK,

Deee~~d,.

P!Jaiatiffs arn,d, Appellants,

vs.·-

tJtlTA B. ESCHLER,
Defendiolnt OltZd Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPOND·ENT

!fiL
.
.
....
./)~ .· . ]£DAY, QUINNEY

~~ _·· C2 8 MA•

·~ .· ........... ~......

......

~

& NEBEKER,

·

fliPnq,£ ~~--~
. Datitt~

.

Attorneys for Defendant
amd, Respondent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law
. Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.............................................................. 1
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, DECREE ........ 10
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................ 14
Deeds Signed and Acknowledged by Grantor ............................
Deeds Complete when Delivered ....................................................
Grantor's Subsequent Conduct Consistent with Completed Gift..
Grantor's Intention Should Control ..................................................
Importance of Grantor-Grantee Relations ....................................
Grantor's Subsequent Conduct not Inconsistent with
Delivery ..........................................................................................
Deeds Complete Before Delivery ....................................................
Testamentary Documents do not Mfect Respondent's Title....
Proof Establishes due Execution of Deeds ....................................
Russell Eschler a Competent Witness ............................................

14
15
19
23
26
40
51
60
64
67

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 70
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Allen v. Allen, 51 N.W. 473 (Minn.) ........................................................ 63
Barth v. Barth, Wash., 143 P. 2d 542 .................................................... 53
Beatty v. Shelley, 42 Utah 592, 132 P. 1160 ............................................ 51
Boyer v. Hadley, Ind., 66 N.E. 2d 903 .................................................... 46
Boyle v. Dinsdale, 45 Utah 112, 143 P. 136 ........................23, 24, 27, 43
Brant v. Brant, Calif., 260 P. 342 ....................................... .42, 45, 48, 49
Bryant v. Barger, Ind., 42 N.E. 2d 429 .................................................... 53
Calhoun v. Dras'S, Penna., 179 Atl. 568 .................................................... 56
Cell v. Drake, Ida., 100 P. 2d 949 ............................................... .42, 46, 50
Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P. 2d 355 ............ 26, 38, 39, 43
44, 47, 49
Chestnut v. Worley, Okla., 23 P. 2d 196 ................................................ 54
Columbia Trust Company v. Anglum, 63 Utah 353, 225 P. 1089 ........ 27
In Re Cunningham's Estate, Wash., 143 P. 2d 852 ........................ 28, 44
DeCou v. Howell, Calif., 214 P. 444 ............................ 29, 32, 42, 44, 4 7
Durbin v. Bennett, Ill., 31 Fed. Sup. 24 ................................................ 54
Edmonson v. Waterston, Mo., 119 S.W. 2d 318 .................................... 56
Farmers Bank v. Worthington, Mo., 46 S.W. 745 .............................. 57
Fender v. Foust, Mont., 265 P. 15 ............................................................ 48
Gappmeyer v. Wilkinson, 53 Utah 236, 177 P. 763 ........ 27, 31, 40, 43
44, 47, 50
Gilbert v. Plowman, Iowa, 256 N.W. 746 ................................................ 58
Gilmore v. Shearer, Iowa, 197 N.W. 631 ................................................ 52
Hall v. Kary, Iowa, 110 N.W. 930 ............................................................ 58
Helper State Bank v. Crus, 95 Utah 320, 81 P. 2d 359 .... 24, 25, 27, 43
Herman v. Mortenson, Calif., 164 P. 2d 551 ....................................42, 46
Hinshaw v. Hopkins, Calif., 99 P. 2d 283 ........................................... .42, 45
Sponsored
by the S.J. v.
Quinney
Law Library.
provided
by the Institute of Museum and Library 57
Services
Clark,
Mo., Funding
110 S.for
W.digitization
2d 1110
................................................
Holliday
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-(Continued)
Page
Kay v. Walling, Okla., 225 P. 385 ............................................... .42, 48, 50
Maxfield v. Sain'Sbury, 110 Utah 280, 172 P. 2d 122 .......................... 69
Moore v. Trott, Calif., 122 P. 462 .......................................................... 45
Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 P. 911 ........................................ 68, 69
Murray v. Beal, 23 Utah 548, 65 P. 726 ................................................ 65
Neely v. Buster, Calif., 195 P. 736 ............................................................ 46
Nilson v. Hamilton, 53 Utah 594, 174 P. 624 .......................................... 63
Olson v. Scott, 61 Utah 42, 210 P. 987 ........................................ 27, 68, 69
Prosser v. Nickolay, Wis., 23 N.W. 2d 403 ............................................ 46
Ratterman v. Lodge, 13 F. 2d, 805 .......................................................... 46
Reed v. Knudson, 80 Utah 428, 15 P. 2d 347 ................................27, 66
Roche v. Roche, Ill., 121 N.E. 621 ....................................................29, 49
Singleton v. Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 P. 63 ................................32, 43, 66
Smith v. Black, Neb., 9 N.W. 2d 193 ...................................................... 46
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 465 ................................ ~D., 66
Stewart v. Silva, Calif., 221 P. 191 ............................................ 28, 42, 47
Strange v. Maloney, Okla., 61 P. 2d 725 .................................................. 5.5
Tarpey v. Deseret Salt Co., 5 Utah 205, 14 P. 338........................64, 65
Trout v. Taylor, 17 P. 2d 761 (Calif.) .................................................... 63
Tumansky v. Woodruff, Calif., 57 P. 2d 1372 ........................................ 59
Utah State Building and Loan Assn. v. Perkins, 53 Utah 474,
173 P. 950 ..........................................................................................51, 62
In Re Van Alstine's Estate, 26 Utah 193, 72 P. 942 ............................ 69
Waskey v. Chambers, 56 L. Ed. 885, 224 U.S. 564 ............................ 65
White v. Smith, Ill., 169 N.E. 817 .................................................... 29, 47
Wilcox v. Hardesty, Calif., 212 P. 633 ............................................. .48, 50
Wilkerson v. Seib, Calif., 127 P. 2d 904 ........................................46, 48
Williams v. Kidd, Calif., 151 P. 1 .............................................................. 30
Wilson v. Wilson, 32 Utah 169, 89 P. 443 ............ 27, 31, 40, 42, 43, 47
Wood v. Wood, 87 Utah 394, 49 P. 2d 416 ............................................ 65
Woolley v. Taylor, 45 Utah 227, 144 P. 1094 .................... 27, 31, 40, 43
Wright v. Sconyers, 300 P. 672 .................................................................. 52
TABLE OF TEXTS
Jones on Real Property .............................................................................. 42

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah

WILBUR BURNHAM, CHARLES L.
BURNHAM, FRANCES L. MAYO,
KENNETH A. LUCKEY, and
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMpANY, a corporation, as administrator
of the estate of JENNIE B. SCHANK,
Deceased,

Case No.
7209

PZa,iJntiffs and Appellants,

vs.
LETA B. ESCHLER,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The essential inquiry here is to discover the purpose and intention of Jennie B. Schank in connection
with the execution and delivery of the deeds which are
the subject of this litigation. As a background against
which to project such an inquiry, there must be clearly
before the court all of the important fact;s in the relationship between grantor and grantee. The significant facts
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2
feel under obligation to the court and to our client to set
them forth her~e.
At the time first referred to in the record, the sevveral members of the Burnham family resided in Salt
Lake City. They were Mrs. Burnham, the mother, three
daughters and two brothers. The brothers were Wilbur
and Charles L. Burnham, who are appellants in this
case. The sisters were Jennie, Maritta and Sonoma Burnham. (Tr. 3, 4)
Jennie Burnham married Louis Schank. (Tr. 117,
123, 180) She and Louis established a business on lower
Second Avenue in Salt Lake City. ( Tr. 102, 103, 118,
119, 163, 168, 180, 214) They devoted themselves to
the business and prospered in the pursuit of it. (Tr. 104,
105, 119, 181) Unfortunately, they remained childless to
the end of their days. (Tr. 3) Sonoma Burnham married
a man named Luckey. She became the mother of two
children, Kenneth Luckey and Frances Luckey Mayo,
who are appellants in this case. (Tr. 3) Maritta Burnham married a man by the name of Brazier. (Tr. 101,
102) They established their home near that of Jennie
and Louis. (Tr. 102, 103, 123) Maritta became the
mother of two children, a boy Melvin and a daughter
called Leta, who is respondent here. (Tr. 101, 102)
When Leta was five years of age her father died and
her mother was required to find work in order to support
herself
(Tr.provided
102)by theHer
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.

6:00 each evening. Shortly after her father's death Leta
began her schooling at the Lafayette School near the
home of her mother, and near the home of Mrs. Schank.
(Tr. 103)
Leta went from her school in the afternoon to the
home of her Aunt Jennie Schank to await her mother's
return from work. (Tr. 103) The habit of going from
school to the Schank home became fixed in the life of
Leta, and was the beginning of a lasting companionship
between Leta and her Aunt Jennie and Uncle Louis
Schank. The affectionate attachment thus established
continued and grew from those early beginnings to the
very last day of Jennie Schank's life. Jennie Schank, being ehildless, found an object for her affection and devotion in the little girl. (Tr. 60, 82, 83, 84, 85, 103-107,
108, 109, 113, 114, 119, 120, 124, 125, 126, ·140, 149, 150,
158,165,166,167,173,181)
During the joint lives of Louis and Jennie Schank,
both of them focused their attention and devotion and
their tender care upon Leta. Louis and Jennie so far
prospered that they were able to attend conventions of
the National Grocers' Association at various cities in
the United States far removed from Salt Lake City, and
on many such trips they took Leta with them. Wh-en Leta
was ten, Jennie and Louis Schank took her with them
on a trip to Alaska. When she was sixteen, they took her
on a three month's tour of Europe. (Tr. 85, 104, 105, 106,
107, 113, 114, 119, 120, 123, 124, 130, 131, 133, 139, 140,
148,149,150,165,166,173,180,181)
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In the day to day routine of life, Leta occupied the
place in the hearts of both Jennie and Louis Schank
which a natural child would have occupied. (Tr. 40, 59,
60, 82, 83, 104, 105, 113, 114, 116, 119, 120, 126, 173)'
Jennie bought new Clothes for Leta and repaired old
ones. (Tr. 82, 105, 125, 12·6, 139, 148, 173) She paid for
dancing lessons and when the dancing lessons had progressed so far that Leta became expert, Jennie Schank
drove her in her automobile to places of exhibition and
proudly ·exhibited Leta as the result of her care and attention. (Tr. 100, 106, 108, 109, 124, 125, 132, 148, 173)
In 1935, Leta was married to Logan Russell Eschler
and established a home of her own in Salt Lake City.
That marriage, rather than weakening the bond of affection between Leta and Mrs. Schank, brought on an
·even stronger attachment, and the devotion of Mrs.
Schank to Leta was enlarged to encompass Leta's children and her husband. In 1936, Louis Schank died. The
loss of Louis strengthened the devotion of J.ennie for
Leta and singled out Leta more definitely than before as
the na;tural object of Jennie's bounty. (Tr. 106, 119, 120,
126, 173)
In 1941, Leta's husband joined the armed forces and
was required to report at San Louis Obispo in California.
Leta and her little ones joined the husband in California,
where they maintained a home in several communities
during the war. During that time Mrs. Schank made frequent visits to Leta's home in California, and on many
occasions Mrs. Schank put up fruit in Salt Lake City
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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children. \Yhen she was not with Leta and children in
California, she wrote them at least once a week, and
almost daily called Leta's mother, ~Iaritta Brazier, to inquire if any word had come from Leta or the children.
While Leta's husband, Russell, was overseas, Mrs.
Schank wrote him once a week. ( Tr. 52-57, 82, 83, 84, 90,
106,107,108,131)
In the meantime, Mrs. Schank was not thoughtless
of her mother, but except for her mother, there is no
evidence that any other member of the family shared the
affection and attention of ~Irs. Schank with Leta. After
the death of ~irs. Schank's mother in 1944, Mrs. Schank
made Leta and her children the sole object of her devotbn. (Tr. 45, 60, 82, 85, 86, 87, 106, 107, 108, 113, 114,
115, 116, 119, 120, 126, 130, 133, 134, 139, 140, 149, 150,
152,154,165,166,167,173,182)
The facts that we have recited are entirely without
dispute in the record. In addition to members of the
family who testified, thirteen friends of long standing
who knew Mrs. Schank intimately and saw her frequently, appeared and testified as to the relationship between
her and Leta. To some of the witnesses Mrs. Schank
had stated specifically that the only thing she had left
in life was Leta and her children. (Tr. 82, 106, 119, 120,
126, 139, 140, 173) To others she had stated that her
purpose was to see to it that Leta and her children were
given security. (Tr. 62, 63, 65, 88, 89, 90, 166) Others
had stated that friends of both Mr. and Mrs. Schank had
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them that Le.ta was the natural child of Jennie and Louis.
(Tr. 158, 181)
Because the decisions dealing with kindred problem3 lay much emphasis on the relationship between
grantor and grantee, it is important to bear in mind that
Leta was the natural object of Mrs. Schank's affection
and bounty. They were in no sense strangers. The blood
relationship was that of aunt and niece, which relationship is in itself important and is in its·elf sufficient to
make Leta a natural obiect of Mrs. Schank's bounty, but
in this case the relationship was of a peculiar and unusual quality. Al'l of the witnesses who had ample and
constant opportunity to observe, made it plain, not only
that the devotion of Mrs. Schank to Leta began while the
child was small, but that it persisted to the end of Mrs.
Schank's life, and when we say the end of Mrs. Schank's
life, we mean to the very last day. Mrs. Schank died suddenly at the Elk's Club in Salt Lake City on the evening
of March 30, 1947. That very afternoon she proudly reported to two of her friends that she had tha:t day sent
away a parcel as a gift to one of Leta's children. (Tr.
3,149,150,167)
What did the record show as to Mrs. Schank's attitude to her other relatives~ No witness came forward
to testify that she ever spoke affectionately of any of
the m·embers of her family, ·with the exception of her
mother, and on occasions of her sister Maritta. No claim
was ever brought forth that any other member of Mrs.
Schank's family shared her affection with Leta. In fact,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Libraryis
Services
and Technology Act,
administered
by the Utah Stateseldom
Library.
the record
undisputed
'that
appellants
visited
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
at her hon1e, and that she cared little about them. (Tr.
-:1:3, 86, S7, 115, 116) It is also the undisputed evidence
that :Jirs. Schank held one of the appellants, Charles L.
Burnham-referred to in the record as Roy Burnhamin such low esteem that she would not allow him to set
foot upon her property. ( Tr. 15-±)
It being clear that :Jirs. Schank focused her devotion
upon Leta and her family, and that it was her desire and
intention to make substantial provision for Leta and her
family, did she do anything to carry her purpose and intention into effect?
~Irs.

Schank was the owner of many parcels of real
estate in Salt Lake County. (Tr. 13, 14, 174) Some were
unimproved, while some were improved and yielded revenue. (Tr. 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 76) As the
own~r of the property, she managed and maintained and
preserved it. In addition to owning real ·estate, she owned
mortgages and notes and other revenue-producing assets. (Tr. 42, 157, 162, 164, 169, 194) From time to time
she did business with C. H. Dowse and his son S. W.
Dowse, who maintained a real ·estate office on State
Street in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 36, 40, 42) On the 20th
day of December, 1938, ~Irs. Schank called at the office of Mr. Dowse and his son, where she directed that
certain deeds be prepared. In accordance with her reque:5t, Mr. S. W. Dowse prepared at least nine real estate
deeds, in accordance with Mrs. Schank's directions. Each
deed described a specific parcel of land in Salt Lake
County. The deeds were thereafter signed by Jennie B.
Sclnnk in the presence of S. W. Dowse, and Mrs. Shank's
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acknowledgment was taken by C. H. Dowse as Notary
Public. C. H. Dowse was dead at the time of the trial,
but S. W. Dowse was sworn and testified that the deeds
were signed by Mrs. Schank in his pres·ence. (Tr. 36, 37,
38, 29, 40)
Among the deeds made out by S. W. Dowse and
signed by Mrs. Schank on that occasion were the nine
deeds involved in this litigation. (Tr. 36, 37) When
the deeds were made out and signed, Mrs. Schank asked
that the name of the grantee be left blank. After she had
signed the deeds, and after her acknowledgment had been
taken by C. H. Dowse, Mrs. Schank stated that she would
supply the name of the grantee in the deeds at a later
time when she would see to it that the property went to
the party she wanted to have it, and would not go to
members of her family whom she did not care to have it.
(Tr. 36, 39, 40, 45) 'She carried the deeds away from Mr.
Dowse's office without having the name of the grantee
filled in. (Tr. 47) The record is silent as to where the
deeds were kept thereafter, or as to when the name of
Leta B. Eschler was fi'lled in as grantee. But the record
is such as to compel the conclusion that they were filled
in by or under the direction of Mrs. Schank in her lifetime.
In March of 1946 Mrs. Schank made one of her many
visits to Leta and her family. Leta was then living in
Saratoga, California. While visiting in Saratoga, Mrs.
Schank sat and talked with Leta's husband, L. Russ·ell
Eschler. She handed him an envelope which contained the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stated that she was ''giving these properties to Leta and
she wanted me to hold them until after her death. She
made that express request, and that-she stated that
she didn't want Leta to feel any personal obligation to
her while she was still living.'' At the time the parcel
of deeds was delivered to Leta's husband, Mrs. Schank
and Leta's husband discussed the husband's income and
the revenue that was derived from the properties covered by the deeds. ~Irs. Schank stated that it was her
opinion that it would be a burden upon Leta and her husband. to pay the taxes, which were in excess of the revenues on the property, and stated that she wanted to pay
the taxes herself for Leta. ( Tr. 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65)
Thereafter, Leta's husband opened the envelope containing the deeds and examined them. ( Tr. 74) The
deeds named Leta B. Eschler as grantee, and were in all
respects complete ~deeds. ·They were in the
same condition when delivered to Russell Eschler as they
were when offered in evidence in the court below, except for the recording data put upon them by the Recorder of Salt Lake County. ( Tr. 64, 75)
Upon her return from California, Mrs. Schank
stated to the witness, Daisy Bane, that she had been visiting with Leta and tha;t she had left some deeds with Russell. (Tr. 87, 88)
Russell Eschler placed the deeds in a briefcase with
his •1wn personal papers and said nothing about them to
Leta. Approximately a year after delivering the deeds to
Russell,
Mrs. Schank died. Following her funeral, Russel1
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delivered the deeds to Leta and she placed them of
record in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake
County. (Tr. 11, 12, 64)
Following deliv,ery of the deeds by Mrs. Schank to
Leta's husband, Mrs. Schank continued to manage the
property and to collect the revenues therefrom and to
pay the taxes levied thereon. She discussed with certain
real estate brokers the possibility of selling one or more
of the parcels of land, but she never sold or encumbered
the land in any way. (Tr. 49, 51, 203,204, 221) The property covered by the nine deeds was not self-sustaining,
and it was entirely consistent with the statement made
by Mrs. Schank to Russell Eschler at the time of delivery that she should maintain and preserve the property by the collection of rents and the payment of taxes
until Leta's enjoyment of the property should take effect, or until she was in a financial condition to carry the
burden of the property. (Tr. 31, 32, 63, 65, 76)
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DECREE
The trial court saw and heard all of the witnesses
and examined all of the documents received in e\'idence.
He listened to the arguments of counsel, then made his
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree, quieting
title to all of the parcels of land involved in this litigaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In substance the court found that Leta B. Eschler
was the object of ~Irs. Schank's love and affection, and
therefore the natural object of her bounty; that on December 20, 1938, Jennie B. Schank, at the office of S.
W. Dowse in Salt Lake City, signed and acknowledged
each of the nine deeds involved in this case ; that at
various times to various persons Jennie B. Schank had
made known her intention to provide for the security of
Leta B. Eschler and her children. He found that some
time prior to March of 1946, Jennie B. Schank completed
each of the nine deeds by inserting, or causing to be inserted, in each of the same the name of Leta B. Eschler
as grantee and that in the month of March, 1946, Jennie
B. Schank delivered each and all of the nine deeds so
completed to Russell Eschler, the husband of Leta B.
Eschler, with the statement that she was giving the
properties to Russell's wife Leta. He found that at the
time of delivering the said deeds to Russell Eschler,
Jennie B. Schank intended to and did completely and irrevocably divest herself of control and dominion over
said deeds; that simultaneously with the delivery of said
deeds, Jennie B. Schank informed Russell Eschler that
the property described in said deeds was being given to
Leta for the security and protection of Leta; that Leta
should not be informed of the delivery of the deeds during the lifetime of Jennie B. Schank. He found that at
the time of delivery of said deeds to Russell Esch1er,
Jennie B. Schank further expressed the desire that she
continue to pay the taxes and expenses incident to the
management and maintenance of the property, so that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the management and expense of said property would not
he a burden upon Leta or her family.
Further, the court found that after delivery of the
deeds, Jennie B. Schank continued in the management,
control and possession of the property for the use and
benefit of Leta B. Eschler; that at the time of the delivery of the deeds and thereafter until the death of J ennie B. Schank, the expense and maintenance of the properties exceeded the revenues therefrom; that Jennie B.
Schank collected the rents and paid the taxes and expen3es of maintenance; that after the delivery of said
deeds, Jennie B. Schank from time to time made statements indicating her ownership of the property and discussed the possibility of selling one or more parcels of
land with 1and brokers. But Jennie B. Schank never did
sell or agree to sell any of the property. The court found
that with reference to one parcel of land described in
one of the deeds described herein, Jennie B. Schank
stated that such parcel of land could not be sold until
and after Jennie B. Schank had conferred with Leta and
learned from Leta whether she would rather have the
property or the benefits of a sale; that as to another
parcel of land described in another of the said deeds,
Jennie B. Schank stated that such parcel of land belonged
to Leta; that Jennie B. Schank never sought to regain
possession or control of any of the deeds after their
delivery by her to Russell Eschler; that upon her return
to Salt Lake City, after delivering the deeds to Russell,
Jennie B. Schank stated to a neighbor that while in CaliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the death of Jennie B. Schank, Russell Eschler handed
the deeds to Leta, as requested in her lifetime by Jennie
B. Shank.
Further, i:he court found that in her lifetim·e, Jennie
B. Schank intended that the property here involved
should be the property of Leta, and that Jennie B.
Schank made delivery of the deeds to carry out her intention in that respect.
And, finally the court found that the deeds involved
herein were not changed or altered in any respect whatsoever after their delivery to Russell Eschler; and that
the possession of said deeds by Russell Eschler was not
obtained without the full knowledge and consent of
Jennie B. Sehank; and that the delivery of said deeds
was not contrary to the intention or wishes of Jennie B.
Schank.
The findings of fact made by the court were fully
supported by the evidence, and any contrary findings
would have been in conflict with the undisputed evidence
in the record.
In harmony with its findings of fact, the court concluded as a matter of law that Jennie B. Schank did not
die jntestate on the 30th day of March, 1947, with respect
to any of the property described in the deeds involved in
this case; and that at the time of her death she was not
seized in fee simple of said properties; and that pJaintiffs Wilbur Burnham, Charles L. Burnham, Frances L.
Mayo and Kenneth Luckey and Maritta Brazier did not
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upon the death of Jennie B. Schank become the owners
and entitled to possession of the said property, as tenants in common, or otherwise; and that the defendant
Walker Bank & Trust Company, as administrator of the
Estate of Jennie B. Schank, deceased, is not entitled to
possession of said properties, or any of them, for the
purpose of administration, or any other purpose at all.
The court further concluded that defendant is now
entitled to possession of each of the parcels of real estate
described in plaintiffs' complaint and covered by the
deeds involved herein; that the plaintiffs, and each of
them, have no right, title or interest in or to said properties, or any part thereof; that the complaint of plaintiffs should be dismissed.
ARGUMENT
Having made its findings of fact and conclusions of
law, as above set forth, the court made and entered its
order and judgment quieting title to the property described in plaintiffs' complaint and in the deeds involved herein in Leta B. Eschler.
DEEDS SrGNED AND AcKNOWLEDGED

BY

GRANTOR

By their pleadings, appellants attacked the right
and claim of Leta B. Eschler by alleging that at no time
did Jennie B. Schank make any delivery of the deeds
involved, and that Jennie B. Schank did not intend that
the deeds involved should be delivered to Leta B. Eschler.
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in s'lid deeds was filled in without the knowledge or consent of the grantor, and that the said deeds are fraudulent. N"o evidence was produced by the appellants to substantiate any of their allegations. In their labored argument over the execution and acknowledgment of the
deeds, counsel for appellants seem unwilling to grapple
with the facts of the case and seek refuge in the protecti.:>n of certain decisions which deal with entirely different facts. That Jennie B. Schank did sign the deeds
and did acknowledge her signature is entirely beyond
dispute in this case. S. \V. Dowse made out the deeds
at the grantor's request, and saw her sign them. In addition, he saw her acknowledge the execution of the
deeds before his father who was a Notary Public. Such
was Dowse's sworn testimony, and no effort was made
to challenge or discredit a word he said. (Tr. 36-40)
When Jennie B. Schank left Dowse's office with the
deeds, she stated that she would supply the names of the
grantees, so that the property would pass to the party
whom she desired to have it and avoid passage of the
title to relatives whom she did not want to have the
property. (Tr. 39, 40, 45) That she did supply the name
of the grantee, as she stated she would do, is also left
clear upon the record. (Tr. ·60-65, 87, 88) Just when Mrs.
Schank filled in the name of Leta B. Eschler is not
disclosed.
DEEDS CoMPLETE WHEN DELIVERED

But whenever or wherever Mrs. Schank supplied the
name of Leta B. Eschler in each of the deeds, it is plain
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that it was done before delivery of the deeds to Russell
Eschler. In March, 1946, she delivered all nine of the
deeds to Russell Eschler, and when the deeds were delivered they were executed and acknowledged deeds, complete in every particular, with Leta named as grantee.
Such is the sworn testimony of Russell Eschler. (Tr.
60-65) The trial court saw and observed Russell Eschler
upon the witness stand and believed his testimony. The
court reflected that belief in positive findings of fact.
Counsel urged that Russell was not worthy of belief, because he abstracted a sheet from one of Mrs.
Schank's informal books of account. Russell made no
effort to conceal the fact that he carried away the page,
and made no effort to deny that it was a mistake on his
part to have done so. He freely admitted the mistake and
restored the page to the record so that it would be before
the trial court for his examination and consideration. The
page removed had to do with small financial dealings between Russell Eschler and Mrs. Schank. It was lying in
the buffet in Mrs. Schank's dining room after her death
and was subject to examination by Frances Mayo and
other hostile members of the family. Russell was annoyed
at the prospect of hostile people examining the record
of his dealings with Mrs. Schank and impulsively removed the page. He recognized his error and made
amends by restoration of the page to the record.
Appellants not only make the most of Russell's removal of the page, but they in their desperation make
the ~harge that after Mrs. Schank's death Russell EschSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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recognition of the utter futility of their case could lead
them to any such base and groundless charge. When
~Irs. Schank died, her house safe was so securely locked
that it required a locksmith to open it. (Tr. 98, 107) When
the safe was opened those present were ~Irs. Mayo, (Tr.
97, 217, 227) one of the appellants; Leta B. Eschler, (Tr.
97) respondent; :Mrs. niaritta Brazier, (Tr. 107) who is
Mrs. Eschler's mother; Mrs. Daisy Bane, (Tr. 97) who
was a close friend and neighbor of ~Irs. Schank; and
Melvin Brazier, (Tr. 97) a nephew of Mrs. Schank, and
a brother of respondent. Mrs. Mayo was the one who
actively examined the contents of the safe. (Tr. 98)
There is no evidence that Leta B. Eschler removed, or
even touched, any of the contents of the safe. Mrs. Mayo
was looking for a receipt. ( Tr. 98, 100, 215) When her
search of the safe was completed, she was satisfied the
safe contained no receipt. (Tr. 98-100, 227) A search
which would satisfy her that no receipt was in the safe
would certainly have disclosed to her the presence of nine
deeds if they had been there. Even Mrs. Mayo saw no
deeds. But Mrs. Mayo did see some documents among the
contents of the safe which she was not willing to have
anyone else see. In the presence of the four others, Mrs.
Mayo took a document from the safe which she read and
then appropriated with the statement that "No one is
going to see this'', and no one, as far as the record shows,
ever saw the document which was removed by Mrs. Mayo.
our imagination, as appellants have done, to conclude
(Tr. 99, 100) We would not need to give free flight toJ
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that the document abstracted by Mrs. Mayo was something most damaging to her case and equally helpful to
respondent. It may have been a will leaving all of Mrs.
Schank's estate to Leta. It may have be·en a letter making
doubly clear Mrs. Schank's purpose and intention to convey the nine parcels of land involved in this case to
Leta. Whatever it was, and whatever her motive in taking the paper from the safe and concealing it, certainly
one in her position requires an unusual hardihood to suggest that Russell Eschler had gone into the safe in the
night and stolen the deeds. There should be some evidence to sustain such a venomous charge. The trial court
didn't believe that Russell Eschler stole or altered any
deeds. He found to the contrary.
Not only did Russell impress the court as worthy of
belief, but his testimony as to the delivery of the deeds
to him was corroborated by the testimony of Daisy
Bane. Mrs. Bane was a tenant of Mrs. Schank and lived
in a house at the rear of Mrs. Schank's home. She was
a close and confidential friend of Mrs. Schank. They
visited in Mrs. Bane's home almost ·every day. After
returning from Saratoga, California, in March of 1946,
Mrs. Schank told Mrs. Bane that she had left some
deeds with Russell. ( Tr. 80, 81, 87, 88) Can anyone
doubt that the deeds she referred to were the same deeds
to which Russell Eschler referred in his testimony, and
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GRANTOR's SuBSEQUENT CoNDUCT
CoNSISTENT WITH CoMPLETED GIFT

Appellants point to the fact that ~Irs. Schank remained in control of the property, collecting the rentals
and paying the costs of maintenance and exercising other
acts of dominion, and urge that those circumstances require a holding by the court that she never intended the
gift to be completed in her lifetime. Under the cases which
we will cite hereinafter, retention of control is a circumstance to be considered by the trier of the facts, along
with all other facts in the case. Such retention is evidence upon the question of intention of the grantor, but
is by no means conclusive.
In this case, retention of management by Mrs.
Schank was entirely consistent with her expressed purpose at the time the deeds were delivered to respondent's
husband. In March 1946, when Mrs. Schank left the
deeds with Russell Eschler, she stated that the property
was not self-sustaining, and that she would like to manage and maintain it so no burden would fall upon the
Eschler family, while Russell was trying to re-establish
himself after the war. (Tr. 63-65) An effort was made
by appellants to prove that Mrs. Schank was wrong about
the property not being self-sustaining. William J. Fitzpatrick, Trust Offioor of Walker Bank and Trust Company, which is one of the appellants herein, was produced and sworn as a witness by appellants before the
trial court. While on the witness stand, Fitzpatrick testified that he had examined the books and records of Mrs.
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Sch3-nk and was familiar with the revenues and the expenses, coming from and attaching to the property in
suit. He testified that the revenues were insufficient to
pay the taxes and other costs of maintaining the property. (Tr. 31-32) So that Mr. Fitzpatrick, who is an
appellant and who was a witness, was in full agreement
with Mrs. Schank that the property was not self-sustaining. But the trial court, over the objection of defendants, allowed counsel to reopen the matter upon
rebuttal and to offer in evidence, through an employee
of the State Tax Commission, an individual tax return,
which showed that in the year 1946 Mrs. Schank had a
taxable income of $500.00. (Ex. "0") Upon cross examination, it was made plain that Mrs. Schank's taxable
income resulted from all her income, which included
renb1s upon the property now in suit, as well as interest
upon mortgages and other investments. (Tr. 193-194)
So that while it is not vital in this case, it is clear beyond
dispute that the property covered by the deeds was not
self-sustaining, and that Mrs. Schank knew what she
was talking about when she told Russell Eschler that
the care and maintenance of the property would be a
burden upon Leta if she assumed management and control of it at the time the deeds were delivered. Mrs.
Schank felt that by holding on to the property, Leta and
her children would have security. By retaining management of the property and discharging the costs and expenses connected therewith, Mrs. Schank would reliev,e
Leta and her family of the burden of maintaining the
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One parcel of land here involved is located near
:\Inrray and was referred to upon the trial as the Murray property. Several persons sought to purchase that
parcel of land from :Jirs. Schank. To some of them she
professed ownership of the property, but declined to
sell and gave as the reason therefore that taxes upon
the purchase price would be too high. The fact is she did
not sell or in any way encumber any of the property after
the deeds had been delivered to Russell Eschler. She was
under no obligation to give any reason to any real estate
broker for not selling, but she did use taxes as an elx:.cuse.
But Mrs. Schank felt under some obligation to Mr.
and l\Irs. Herbert A. Towers, who had expressed a desire
to buy the property. She had previously told them that if
she ever sold the property, she would give them the first
opportunity to buy. After she had delivered the deeds
to Russell Eschler, Mr. and Mrs. Towers again importuned Mrs. Schank to sell. When urged by them to sell
the property, she stated to Mrs. Towers that before the
property could be sold she, Mrs. Schank, would have to
consult with Leta and learn from Leta whether she
would prefer to keep the property, or have it sold and
have the purchase price. (Tr. 175, 176, 178) This is clear
evidence that Mrs. Schank, in the fall of 1946, felt that
she no longer could dispose of the property without
Leta's consent.
When Mrs. Schank's friend, Mrs. Tallman, suggested some disposition of a parcel of land on Second
Avenue in Salt Lake City, which is covered by one of the
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deeds here in question, Mrs. Schank stated to Mrs. Tallman that her wishes with respect to the final disposition
of this property had already been carried out. ('Tr. 165,
166, 168) In conversations with Mrs. Bane pertaining to
this same property, she also stated that she would never
tear down the old store which stands upon part of that
property, but that she hoped some day Leta would do
so and build an apartment house or duplex upon it. (Tr.
89)

Mrs. Schank's handling of the property, after she

h~d

made delivery of the deeds, was not inconsistent with
her purpose to give in her lifetime the title to the property to Leta. In her lifetime, Mrs. Schank made delivery of nine fully completed, ·executed and acknowledged deeds. This is not a case in which the deeds were
completed after deli~ery, or in which the deeds were completed before delivery by someone not properly authorizd to do so by the grantor.
Appellants, in discussing Mrs. Schank's management
of the property after she had delivered the deeds, ref.er to the fact that the parcel of land described in one
of the deeds was sold under contract. That there is no
significance to such circumstance will clearly appear
when it is remembered that the contract of sale was made
not after, but two years before, the deeds were delivered.
When she delivered the deeds, Mrs. Schank told Russell
Eschler that one parcel of land was subject to contract of
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the land was paid and impounded pending a decision of
this case.
Examination of the cases will show that the trial
court's judgment and decree quieting title in Leta B.
Eschler is sustained by most abundant authority.
GRANTOR's INTENTION SHoULD ConTROL

By their brief, counsel for appellants would persuade the court that the all-important basic question to
be determined in this case is whether Mrs. Schank observed to the letter all of the niceties of the technical
rule~ of conveyancing. That. the essentials of these rules
are important matters to be considered we do not deny.
However, it occurs to us that appellants from the beginning have shown a disposition to pay very slight attention to a very much more important proposition, which
is: To whom did Mrs. Schank desire to give her property¥
We shall never permit counsel to disregard without
challenge the fact that the property ·was Mrs. Schank's
to dispose of as she saw fit. We respectfully urge that
the tirst duty of this court, just as it was the duty of the
trial court, is to ascertain Mrs. Schank's intentions, if
poss1ble to do so, and then to pay respectful heed to her
wishes. This is the recognized rule of this court, estabiished and stated in the case of Boyle vs. Dinsdale, 45
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Utah 112, 143 P. 136, wherein, passing upon the validity
of a gift by a donor, this court said:
'' * * *A delivery to a trustee is, in legal effect
the same as de1ivery to the donee. Where, therefore, the facts are as palpably clear as they are in
the case at bar that a gift was intended, and where
the forms of law relating to gifts have been substantially complied with, it was the duty of the
trial court, and it is our duty, to uphold and effectuate the purpose and intention of the donor,
and not to defeat them by making nice distinctions
or placing a forced or unnatural interpretation
upon her acts or words. As pointed out by the
courts, each case in which a gift is involved must,
to a large extent, be controlled by its own peculiar
facts and circumstances. While it is true that certain forms of 'law must be complied with, yet it is
also true that the intention of the donor must also
receive due consideration and effect, and if in making a gift he has substantially complied with the
latter, and it is clear that he intended to make a
gift, his intentions must prevail.''

I :

I :

Again, in Helpe.r State Bank vs. Crus, 95 Utah 320,
81 P. 2d 359, this. court said:
"* * * From the foregoing cases it is evident
that the important thing is what was the intent of
the donor at the time of the transactions in question. If he intended a gift, to pass a present title
to the donee, then if his words and acts are sufficient to evidence that intent it is the duty of the
courts to hold that such a gift has taken place, but
a case
this
kind
the evidence
be
clear
as Services
Sponsored by thein
S.J. Quinney
Lawof
Library.
Funding
for digitization
provided by themust
Institute of
Museum
and Library
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
to his
intent.***"
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
Again:
•'If there was any substantial evidence from
which the jury could find that John Crus gave this
money to the defendant, Annie Crus, during his
lifetin1e, then the court erred in directing a verdict
for the plaintiff. * * *''
As we have already pointed out, the record in this
case sustains, without any dissenting or conflicting evidence, the fact that Leta Eschler was the object of Mrs.
Schank's love and affection to the absolute exclusion of
the appellants. The record also conclusively demonstrates
the fixed purpose of Mrs. Schank to make generous provisi'ln out of her property for Leta Eschler's security.
Even the appellants in their brief make grudging admission of this fact, and state that Mrs. Schank probably wanted to provide generously for the respondent,
but failed to translate her desires into effective action.
Thus they say, Mrs. Schank's wishes and desires are to
be thwarted so that appellants, for whom this lady had
an expressed aversion, might reap the benefits which she
had intended to bestow upon another, and even in the
face of the further fact of an expressed determination
by ~Irs. Schank to prevent her property from falling into
the hands of appellants, her undesirable rela:tives.
The fact that respondent was the natural object of
Mrs. Schank's bounty and generosity is of first importance in the inquiry into Mrs. Schank's actual and
probable intentions with respect to her property. In all
of the cases upon the subject which we have read and
considered, this question has, without exception, occupied
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the center of the stage. This eourt, and the courts of all
of the other jurisdictions, have laid much stress and importance upon the relationship between the donor and
donee. The courts go to great lengths to sustain gifts
where the donee is the natural object of the donor's affection, and decline to sustain such gifts only when proof
of non-delivery to the donee is clear and beyond dispute. On the other hand, where the donee is a stranger
to the donor, the courts are much less reluctant to de-·
clare gifts invalid, and this is especially true where the
natural objeets of a donor's bounty will be deprived of
property which they would otherwise receive.
IMPORTANCE OF GRANTOR-GRANTEE RELATIONS

The following cases illustrate the importan-ce of the
relationship between donor and donee in attempting to
arrive at the donor's intention:
In

Chamber~ailn

vs. £,arsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P. 2d

355, this court said :
''This is not a case of a grant to a stranger
where the grantor remained in possession and continued to pay taxes, etc. and we think such conduct in no respect inconsistent with a prior delivery of the deed to the grantee.''
In that case the grantor was the sister of the grantee,
and it was shown that the grantor had expressed her
determination to see to it that the grantee's future should
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In TVoolley vs. Taylor, 45 Utah 227, 144 P. 1094, this
court stressed the relationship existing between the
grantor and the grantee. They were father and daughter.
The court mentions the fact that natural bonds of affection would impel the donor to make the gift to the donee.
In Reed vs. Knudson, 80 Utah 428, 15 P. 2d 347, the
court discusses the fact that a grandfather, grateful to
the donees who had cared for many years for his grandson, and impelled by that gratitude wanted to give ~is
donees part of the property which he had inherited from
the estate of his grandson.
Again, in Wilson vs. Wilson, 32 Utah 169, 89 P. 443,
and jn Gappmeye.r vs. Wilkinson, 53 Utah 236, 177 P. 763,
where the donees were children of the donors, the court
makes much of this relationship in its decision.
In Olson vs. SooU, 61 Utah 42, 210 P. 987, the donor
was the mother of the donee, and resided with the donee,
who cared for her, and in its decision this court again
emphasized the fact that the donee was the natural object of the donor's bounty.
In Columbia Trost Company vs. AngZum, 63 Utah
353; 225 P. 1089, which involved a gift of a bank deposit
from a husband to his wife, the court stresses the relationship of the donor to the donee. See also Boyle vs.
Dinsdale, Helper State Barn.k vs·. Crus, supra.
The following are some cases from other jurisdictions which bear upon this point. Thus In Re Cwnnirng-
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ham's

Es~ate,

Wash., 143 P. 2d 852, the Washington

court said:
''Where the property is deeded to one the
natural object of the donor's affections a gift
rather than a trust is presumed.''
In that case the donee was a favorite nephew of the
donor.
The California court in the case of Stewart vs. Silva,
221 P. 191, said:
''If we not only disregard the testimony of the
witnesses who were present at and participated
in the delivery of the deed to the grantee, and also
disregard the declarations made from time to time
by the grantor that he intended to deed the property to the grantee and that he had deeded the
property to the grantee what have we left in the
evidence to overcome the presumption of delivery
arising from the possession of the deed by the
grantee~ There is nothing substantial. The evidence of continued dealing with the property
by the grantor was not necessarily in conflict with
the actual situation disclosed by the evidence as
offered by the defendant. The grantor was her
godfather, who had brought her to this country to
keep house for him. They lived together, and it
was quite natural that the godfather, the grantor
of the property, should continue to deal with it,
pay taxes, insurance, and live upon the property
with his goddaughter, the grantee, as he in fact
did. This would not show that the deed was not
de'livered and the inferences arising therefrom of
not be
sufficient
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the Services
non-delivery
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ans1ng· from the possession of the deed by the
grantee. The fact that the grantor at the time of
delivery expressed a. desire that the deed should
not be recorded until after his death and intended
to exercise acts of ownership thereover during his
life, if we accept the testimony of the grantee that
such statements were made by him at the time of
delivery of the deed, would not prevent the delivery from being effective, if the grantor in fact
intended to deliver the deed.''
In Roche vs. Roche, Ill., 121 N. E. 621, the court
that where conveyances are made from a parent to
his child, the law makes a stronger presumption of delivery than in cases where the bonds of natural affection
are not involved.
stat~s

In White vs. Smith, another Illinois case, 169 N. E.
817, the court recited the relationship and the-affection
existing between the Grantor and the Grantee, their
mutual respect for each other, and the fact that the
grantee was a favorite niece of the grantor.
In another California case, DeCou vs. Howell, 214
P. 444, where the grantee was a niece of the grantor, the
close bond of affection existing between the grantor and
the grantee was pointed out. It was shown that the
grantee had lived with the grantor for several years
during childhood, and that the grantor had expressed
her intention to third persons of leaving grantee all of
her property. That case is very similar to the case a:t
bar, and points out very strongly the importance of the
relationship between donor and donee which attaches to
the minds of judges in deciding cases of this character.
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Also, in cas·es where the courts have held gift deeds
to he invalid, this question of the relationship between
donor and donee receives much attention.
Thus in Williams vs. Kidd, Calif., 151 P. 1, it was
pointed out by the court that the purported grantee was
not the natural object of the affection and bounty of the
grantor. This court, in the case of Stamley vs. Stanley,
97 Utah, 520, 94 P. 2d 465, cited by appellants in their
brief, pointed out that although the grantor and grantee
were husband and wife, they had been separated for a
long period of time, and it was. not natural to suppose
that the grantee would be the recipient of the grantor's
bounty. Many other cases could he cited illustrating the
great importance of examining with care the relationship between donor and donee.
Because of the importance of the relationship existing between Mrs. Schank and respondent, great care
was taken during the trial of this case to emphasize its
quality and to show beyond any possibility of dispute that
it was of the kind and nature to impel Mrs. Schank to
make gifts of the property in question to Mrs. Eschler.
DELIVERY To THIRD PARTY VALID

That a valid gift of real property may be made by
a grantor by the delivery of a deed to a third party to be
by such third party delivered to the grantee, even after
the death of the grantor, is firmly rooted in the decisions.
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ing to the grantee a present interest in the property.
This court has spoken upon this proposition in unmistakable terms in the following cases:

In Wilson vs. Tril-son, supra, this court said:

'' * * * The law is well settled that
''If a grantor delivers a deed to a third person absolutely as his deed, without reservation
and without intending to reserve any control over
the instrument, though this is not to be de'livered
to the grantee till the death of the grantor, the
deed when delivered upon the grantor's death is
valid, and takes effect from the first delivery.
The deed in such case passes a present inter,est
to be enjoyed in the future. * * *"
And in Gappmeyer vs. W ilMinson, supra :
"It has been determined by this court that,
''Where a grantor delivers a deed to a third
person, absolutely as his deed, without reservation, and without intending to reserve any control
over the instrument, though it is not to be delivered to the grantee until after the grantor's
death, the deed, when delivered, is valid and takes
effect from the first delivery. * * *"
And in Woolley vs. Taylor, supra:

"·* * * That a consummated and valid gift
inter vivos with postponement of present enjoyment may be made cannot be doubted, if the donor
makes unconditional delivery and parts with al1
present and future control and dominion over the
property. * * * Such delivery need not be made
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to the donee personally. It may be made to a
third person as agent or trustee for the use of
the donee. * * * It was so made here. That the
trustee, the banker, was not to make delivery to
the donee until the death of the donor, did not
destroy the validity of the gift. * * * ''
This rule is again stated in the case of Singleton vs.
Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 P. 63, quoted in appellants' brief
as follows:
"The law here applicable is clearly stated in
Williams v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 631, 151 Pac. 1, Ann.
Cas. 1916E, 703, from which we quote:
'It is weU settled that a person may make
a conveyance of property and place it in the hands
of a third party to be delivered to the grantee
named in it on the death of the grantor, and that
such a delivery will be effectual to pass a present
title to the property to the grantee, if the intention of the grantor is to make such delivery absolute and place it beyond the power thereafter to
revoke or control the deed. Where delivery is
made under these circumstances and with this intention, it is fully operative and effective to vest
a present title in the grantee, the grantor retaining only a life ,estate in the property and the
third party or depositary holds the deed as a
trustee for the grantee named in it. Bury v.
Young, 98 Cal. 451, 35 Am. St. Rep. 186, 33 Pac.
338; Moore v. Trott, 156 Cal. 353, 134 Am. St.
Rep. 131, 104 Pac. 578 '.''
Many cases from other jurisdictions have announced
the same rule. We shall cite but one of these. DeC10u vs.
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The undisputed evidence in this cas·e shows that the
deeds under consideration were delivered to Russell
Eschler with the accon1panying statement:
''I am giving these properties to Leta.'' ( Tr.
62, 63)
Furthermore, there is no evidence of any retention
of control over the deeds or reservation of any kind with
respect thereto. The record contains not one shred of evidence that after delivery Mrs. S:chank made any attempt
whatsoever to regain possession of these instruments.
Before leaving this important subject, we again desire to refer to the Record and poin~ out that the fact of
delivery is indisputably proven. In the first place, when
the deeds were made out in the office of the Dowse real
estate firm, Mrs. Schank announced her purpose to complete and deliver the deeds at her own chosen time to
the person she wished to have the property. We quote
from the testimony of S. W. Dowse :

"Q. At the time the deeds wer·e made and signed
by ~Irs. Schank, Mr. Dowse, will you state
what conversation took place and what Mrs.
Schank said with respect to 'these deeds.
A. Mrs. Schank requested us to make out these
deeds ; she said she believed that she wanted
to set some of her affairs in order and that
she wanted to, to have these deeds made so
that at sometime or other that she saw fit she
could convey the property to certain parties,
or certain party, and so that it would not go
to other parties that she did not want the
property
to go to.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

Q. Did she identify the party to whom she intended giving the deeds~
A.

I don't believe she did at that time ; she identified the parti·es she didn't want to, that is,
generally speaking, who she didn't want the
properties to go to.

Q. Did she ever express to you at any subsequent
time the parties she had in mind as the ultimate grantee or beneficiary of these deeds?
A.

To my recollection, I believe she did mention
it later on.

Q.

Can you remember now about when she made
mention of her intention with respect to the
grantee~·

A. Well, not definitely; might have been a year
later or so.

Q. It was sometime after the deeds had been
signed~

A.

That's right.

Q. What individual did she name, or individuals 1
A.

She said she had a niece that she favored
very much, she desired her property-well,
most of her things, to go to, in case anything
happened to her.

Q. Did she name-did she give the name of the
niece at that time~
A. W·ell, she said her niece, Leta." (Tr. 39, 40)
"Q. Tell us now the substance of what Mrs.
Schank said to you regarding these other relatives of hers, members of her family.
remember
the
A.Quinney
Well,
I don't
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she had certain other relatives she didn't get
along with very well, that they were not on
very friendly tern1s, and anything that she
might possess she didn't intend leaving them
anything.'' ( Tr. -!5)
Next we have the uncontroverted evidence of Russell
Eschler. He says:

"Q. Now, :Jir. Eschler, let m,e call your attention
to a particular date, and I will ask you first
of all if you can remember the time when--=or the date when Mrs. Schank came to visit
you at Saratoga, California, the month and
the year when this occurred~
A. I remember the month; I can't place a definite date in the month. I remember the year;
it was in March, 1946.
Q. All right, Mr. Eschler, state whether or not
-have you ever seen these instruments before~ (Exhibits 1 to 9, inclusive)
A. Yes, I have ; they are deeds that Mrs. Schank
delivered to me at Saratoga, California when
she, made her visit to us there in March, 1946.
Q. Are they the deeds you mentioned this morning that you recorded in April of 1947~
A. These are the same deeds.
Q. Now, in connection with the receipt of those
deeds, Mr. Esehler, tell us whether-or tell
the court whether :Mrs. Schank made any
statements of her feelings and any statements at the time to you-at the time she
delivered those deeds.
A. Well, Mrs. Schank stated to me at that time
that she was giving these properties to Leta,
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Q.

and that she wanted me to hold them until
after her death. She made that express request, and that-she stated that she didn't
want Leta to feel any personal ob'ligation to
her while she was still living; that tha;t was
about the substance of it.
State whether or not Mrs. Schank said anything about the revenues produced from these.

THE COURT: I think it is suggestive, but he
may answer.
A. Yes, she made statements-as a matter of
· fact, we discussed my personal income at that
time and the revenue derived from these
properties, and she stated that it was her
opinion that it would be a burden to us to pay
the taxes in excess of the revenues on these
properties, and she stated that she wanted
to pay those taxes herself for Leta.
Q. Now, Mr. Eschler, you have examined the
deeds; tell us whether the deeds, what condition the deeds were in when you received
them.
A. They were in exactly the same condition that
they are in now, other than the recording.
Q. Mr. Eschler, what did you do with the deeds
after you receiv·ed them from Mrs. - - A. I kept them in my home. I have a bri·ef case in
which I keep all my personal papers, and they
were constantly in my possession from the
time Mrs. Schank delivered them to me until
the time I delivered them to Mrs. Eschler
after Mrs. Schank was buried.
THE COURT: Mr. Eschler, just as near as you
can, give us the words Mrs. Schank said so
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A.

I recall she said she wanted Leta to have the
security of those properties at all times, and
she stated tha;t she didn't want us to-that
is, she advised against our selling any of
them immediately, that she thought the security lay in our retention of them and it
·was for that reason that she suggested that
she pay the taxes, inasmuch as my income
would not support my family and support
additional costs on these properties.

THE COURT: Did I understand this is at the
time when she delivered~\.

This is at the time when she delivered the
deeds to me, yes." ( Tr. 60-65)

Appellants did not produce any ,evidence contradicting the testimony of Russell Eschler. He was corroborated by the direct and positive testimony of Mrs. Bane,
to whom ~Irs. Schank reported that she had delivered
deeds covering real property to Russell Eschler :

'' Q. Mrs. Bane, did ~Irs. Schank ever teli you
about having made any disposition of any
part of her property~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. You may answer that yes or no.
A.

Yes, she did.

Q. When did she make mention of the disposition of property to you~
A.

When she returned from Saratoga.

Q. When was
A.

1946.

that~
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Q.

You remember the month~

A.

March.

Q.

Who was present when she made this statement to you about disposing of the property?

A. I don't think there was anyone present.
Q.

You and she were alone together~

A.

Yes.

Q. Where were you~
A. In my home.

Q. What did she tell you at tha:t time~
A.

She told me that she had delivered certain
deeds to Russell.'' (Tr. 87, 88)

We submit that the foregoing record establishes the
delivery of the deeds beyond any question. But even had
respondent failed to ·establish by evidence the delivery of
these deeds from Mrs. Schank to Russel Eschler, the very
fact that the deeds were found in the possession of the
grantee upon the grantor's death and the further fact
that she recorded them, all of which is undisputed, would
have required appellants to show by competent evidence
the fact of non-delivery. Under the decisions of this court,
such a showing is sufficient to prove a prima facie case
of valid delivery. This burden the appellants may not
shift by a mere baseless attack upon the credibility of
Russell Eschler unsupported by any evidence whatsoever.
In the case of Chamberlain vs. Larsen, supra, this
court
that
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by showing the grantee's possession of the deed after the
grantor's death, even though there was no showing that
grantee's possession of the deed originated before the
grantor's death. This court said:
· •The rule seems to be well settled that a
deed duly executed and acknowledged and shown
to be in the possession of the grantee is self-proving both as to the execution and delivery and that
the recording of a deed is likewise evidenc-e of
delivery * * * (Citing cases) and this is true
though the deed be not recorded until after the
death of the grantor * * * '(cases) or though
there be no affirmative showing that the grantee's
possession originated prior to the death of ~the
grantor* * * (cases)."
"And not only is the burden of proving nondelivery upon the plaintiffs, but the inference of
delivery arising from possession of the deed by
the grantee and from the recording thereof is
entitled to great and controlling weight and can
only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence
* * * (cases) . "
''So in this jurisdiction * * * a 'presumption
of law' is a rule of law casting the burden of
proof on him against whom the presumption operates, but when the facts and circumstances are
shown concerning which the presumption is indulged, the presumption ceases and the controversy is tQ be decided by the weight of the evidence adduced, etc. * * * tested by these principles, we think the evidence of the plaintiffs insufficient to sustain the burden of proof and establish the non-delivery of the deed in question.
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This matter of the burden of proof is alluded to only
because it shows how far appellants have failed to sustain their case by competent evidence.
Intention to make a gift of real estate is evidenced
by the surrender of the instrument of title to the donee,
or to some third party for the donee's benefit, without
reservation of control over that instrument by the
grantor. See Woolley vs. Taylor, Wilson vs. Wilson and
Gappmeye.r vs. Wilkinson, supra. Resort may also be
made to the acts of the grantor prior to and at the time
delivery is made, and even to the subsequent acts and
conduct of the grantor .after delivery has occurred. We
shall hereafter make specific reference to the decisions
on this point.
In the record of this case, all of these matters received the full consideration of the trial court. After
due consideration, the trial court found that delivery of
the deeds was made with the intention of giving the properties to respondent. We respectfully submit that any
other finding by the trial court would have been error.
GRANTOR's SuBSEQUENT CoNDUCT NoT
INCONSISTENT wITH DELIVERY

Appellants attack the findings made by the trial
court that there was a delivery of the deeds with an intention to pass an immediate interest to Mrs. Eschler,
upor.t the sole ground that the subsequent acts of Mrs.
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the finding untenable. They ignore entirely the tesHmony
of what preceded and what lH_·rnrrPd at the time of delivel'y, They point out that ~Irs. Schank continued to pay
taxes, collect rents, maintain the property, report the
income from it, and finally that she discussed the sale
of it with various persons and made references to the
property which indicated ownership. All of this subsequent conduct of :Jirs. Schank, which, standing alone,
might appear to be inconsistent, was fully explained by
the respondent. Appellants also have asserted that no
control over or possession of the property was passed
on to Mrs. Eschler at the time of delivery, and consequently there could be no valid transfer of title. We shall
refer to many cases in which the grantee got no control
over the property, and to the fact that in some of the
decisions the grantee was entirely ignorant of the existence of the deed until after the grantor was dead. In such
cases, lack of possession and control has been dismissed
as constituting no proof that an interest did not vest in
the donee upon delivery of deeds.
The8e matters to which counsel refer are only evidence to be considered in arriving at the question of intention, and they have been disregarded in many cases
where they have been shown to exist. The record shows
that when Mrs. Schank made delivery to Eschler, she
explained fully the conduct now seized upon by plaintiffs
as the only substantial hope of depriving Mrs. Eschler of
her property.
Furthermore, appellants completely overlook the
that all of the acts and conduct with respect to this
fact
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property, including Mrs. Schank's declarations of ownership, can be fully and sa:tisfactorily explained on the
basis of the deeds passing title to Mrs. Eschler at the
time of their delivery, with the reservation of a life
estate. In Wils~on vs. Wilson, supra, this court recognized
the rule that where a deed passes. irrevocably beyond the
control of the grantor, a present interest may pass to the
donee, with possession and enjoyment of the property
postponed to a future time. The court said, quoting Jones
on Real Pro\P!e'fity :

'' * * * The deed in such case passes a present
interest to he enjoyed in the future.''
In California, Oklahoma and Idaho, the courts have
held that such a transfer passes title with a life estate
reserved to the grantor. See DeCou vs. Howell, supra,
HimJihaw vs. Hopkins, Calif., 99 P. 2d 283, Stewart vs.
Silva, supra, Brant vs. Brwnt, Calif., 260 P. 342, Herman
vs. Mortenson, Calif., 164 P. 2d 551, Kay vs. W~alling,
Okla., 225 P. 385, Cell vs. Drake, Ida., 100 P. 2d 949.
All of these cases hold that where a grantor delivers
a deed to a third party which is not to be delivered to
the grantee until after the grantor's death, the title
passes subject to a life estate in the grantor. The Supreme Court of Idaho in Cell vs. Drake, supra, said:
''Under a well recognized line of authorities
in this country, a deed to real property may he
executed and placed in the hands of a depositary
or escrow holder for delivery to the grantee after
death
of Funding
the grantor,
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passage of title with a reservation of a life estate
in the grantor.''
Mrs. Schank was not a lawyer and could not be expected to be familiar with the technical rules of conveyancing, but if what she did was consistent with the
requirements of those rules, the court should have no
difficulty in giving effect t.o her intentions.
A grantor may divest himself of title by delivery of
a deed to a third party to be delivered after the grantor's
death to the grantee. Secondly, delivery is a matter of intention, and intention at the time of delivery is controlling. Wilson vs. Wilson, supra, Gappmeyer vs. Wilkitnson.
supra, Singleton vs. Kelly, supra, Boyle vs. Dins male;
supra, and Helper State Bank vs. Crus, supra.
1

If control and possession of the property after delivery of the deed is the decisive factor, then there are
many cases which have wrongfully upheld gifts, because
in many of them, as we have previously stated, no control
or possession was turned over to the grantee. Such was
the fact in Woolley vs. ~aylor, supra, Gappmeyer vs.
Wilkinson, supra, and Chamberlaim vs. Larsen, supra.
In Woolley vs. Taylor, supra, the donor endorsed certain
stock certificates and gave them to his hanker for delivery to his children after his death. The donees never
had possession of the certificates until after the donor
died, when they received them from the banker. The
father took all of the dividends from the stock and exchanged the certificates for new shares issued by the
company.
Yet
in that
theprovided
giftbywas
upheld.
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In Gappmeyer vs. Wilkinsorn, supra, there is nothing
In the record which shows that grantees, who were
grantor's minor children, ever had possession or control of property, and yet the court held that a valid gift
was consummated by the grantor.
In Chambedain vs. Larsen, supra, there is no evidence that the grantee had any possession oi control
over the property prior to the death of the grantor. The
evidence was that the grantee lived upon the property
with the grantor, but that is all the evidence on that point.
The record is conclusive upon the fact that the grantor
managed and controlled the property at all times. Notwithstanding the grantee had no control over the property, the deed was declared valid.

In Re Cunningham's Estate, supra, the Washington
court held specifically that a valid gift of real property
inter vivos could be made and the grantor retain control,
use and management of the property:
''A valid gift of the fee of real estate may be
made inter vivos, donor retaining the use, management and control of the property during his lifetime * * * (Citing cases) ''
Quoting further:
''This may be effected by donor delivering
deed to third party for delivery to donee at
donor's death, if donor irrevocably parts with
possession of deed. * * * " (Citing cases)
In DeCou vs. How ell, supra, the grantee had no
knowledge of any deed in her favor, and obviously could

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

45
not have exercised control over or had possession of the
property.
Likewise in Brant ~·s. Brant, supra, the V!llidity of
deeds was upheld although the grantees knew nothing
about their existence. There was. no evidence that the
grantee exercised any acts of control or ever had possession of the property. This plainly shows again that
counsel are in error when they say that the donee must
have possession and control of the property for the gift
to be good.
In Hinshaw vs. Hopkins, Calif., supra, the grantor
executed the deed and left it with her attorney to be delivered to the grantee in the event she failed to recover
from an operation for cancer. At that time she told the
attorney that if she recovered, the deed was to be returned to her, as she then wanted the property for herself. The deed to the grantee was held valid, though
there was no evidence the grantee ever had possession or
control of the property. The court quotes from M~oore
vs. Trott, Calif., 122 P. 462:
"It has long, if not always, been the rule that
the delivery of an instrument is a question of intent, and that to a complete delivery no precise
form of words and no particular character of act
is necessary. The delivery is sufficient and complete if from any or all of the circumstances the
grantor has made known his intention irrevocably
to part with his dominion and control over the instrument, to the end that it may presently vest
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See also RaJ~terman vs. Lodge, 13 F. 2d 805, which
involved a gift inter vivos of personal property.
In Neely vs. Buste.r, Calif., 195 P. 736, the court
says that when a grantor without reservation parts with
a deed intending thereby a transfer of present interest
to the grantee, the gift is complete. In that case the
grantee knew nothing about the execution of the deed.
That being so, it would have been impossible for her to
assume possession and control of the property.
In Hie·rman. vs. M orotens•on, Calif., 1·64 P. 2d 551, the
grantee never did obtain knowledge of the existence of a
deed in her favor, but died in ignorance of its existence.
It was held the gift was complete. See also Wilkerson vs .
.Seib, Calif., 127 P. 2d 904, where the grantee first learned
of the deed three years after the grantor died.
In Smith vs. BZack, Neb., 9 N.W. 2d 193, the grantees
had no knowledge of deeds in their favor until after the
grantor's death. The gift was held complete.
See also Boyer vs. Badley, Ind., 66 N.E. 2d 903,
where the grantee did not know a deed had been executed
in her favor until after grantor died. Here again the
gift was held complete. See also Pr.o·sser vs. Nickolay,
Wis., 23 N.W. 2d 403, and Cell vs. Drake, supra, which
are to the same effect.
We reiterate that Mrs. Schank's intention and desires with respect to this property lead to but one conclusion, namely, that she intended to give the property to
Mrs.
Eschler.
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tentions in the face of every one of the elements which
the appellants here insist show that the gift in this case
may not be upheld.
In Wilson L'S. Wilson, supra, the evidence showed
that the grantor continued in possession of the proper'ty
after he had executed deeds to it. The grantees testified
that they would have surrendered the deeds to the·
grantor upon his demand. Yet it was held those facts did
not destroy the validity of the deeds.
In Gappmeyer vs. Wilki!Mon, supra, the grantor
made subsequent deeds to the property, which it was held
did not affect the prior gift.
In Cha-mberlain vs. Larsen, supra, the grantor continued to pay taxes and insurance and negotiated for the
sale of the property and made references to it as her
own, and yet the deed was held to constitute a va:lid gift
to grantor's sister.
In DeCou. vs. Howell, Calif., supra, it was held that
a deed was a valid gift where the grantor, after making
the deed, contracted to sell the property described in the
deed, continued to pay the taxes upon the property, and
referred to it in conversations with others as hers.
In White vs. Smith, IlL, supra, grantors negotiated
for the sale of the land a~ter deliv;ery of the deed. This)
was held not to invalidate the gift.
In Stewart vs. Silva, supra, grantors continued the
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eluding leasing the land, and payment of taxes and insurance, which did not overcome the validity of the gift.
In Br(J;nt vs. B~o.;nt, supra, the grantor mortgaged
the property after he executed a deed. H.e also made out
subsequent deeds and a will covering the same land. The
subsequent conduct of the grantor was held not to have
shown an intention not to make a gift at the time the
deed was delivered.
In Wilkerson vs. Seib, supra, the grantor after delivery of the deed continued payment of taxes, insurance,
collection of rentals, all of which the court held did not
show an intention not to make a gift when the deed was
delivered.
In Fender vs. Foust, Mont., 265 P. 15, and Wilcox
vs. 1/tardesty, Calif., 212 P. 633, grantors made deeds and
wills subsequent to delivery of the deeds, which was likewise held not to sustain contentions that no gift had been
made by the grantor.
In J(iay vs. Walling, supra, the grantor listed the
property for sale, which the court also stated did not
prove that no gift had been intended hy the grantor.
All of those cases show that counsels contention with
respect to the controlling effect of a grantor's subsequent acts is just not the law.
Furthermore, the courts have spoken upon the relative weight to he given subsequent acts of the grantor in
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livery, as compared to the weight to he given to what
is shown to have occurred at the time of delivery.
In Chamberla·i.n vs. La·rse·n, supra, this court says
that possession of the deed by the grantee, though not
shown to have originated prior to the grantor's death, is
entitled to great and controlling weight.
The case of Roche vs. Roche, supra, likewise is to
the same effect, especially when the grantor and grantee
are parent and child.
We submit that in this case we have as strong a relationship as could exist between parent and child.
In Bra;nt vs. Brant, supra, the California court has
expressly said that subsequent acts of the grantor are
not conclusive upon the question of intention, but only
furnish evidence to be weighed by the trier of the fact.
vVe cannot leave a discussion of this subject without
reminding the court that Mrs. Schank never did sell any
of the properties described in the deeds before this
court. Even on the best market obtainable, she consistently and steadfastly refused to seil. The reasons which she
gave for not selling are of minor importance. The fact is
that she never deviated from her intent and purpose of
holding all of the properties for her niece according to
her expressed determination.
Furthermore, if the grantor once makes a valid delivery of a deed with the intention of passing title to the
grantee,
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undo what has occurred by subsequent acts, calculated
to divest the grantee of his title.
In Gappmeyer vs. Wilkinson, supra, the grantor attempted to convey the property after delivery of his deed
to a third party for the benefit of his minor children.
This court held his subsequent acts had no effect upon
that delivery. See also Wilcox vs. Bardesty, supra; Kay
vs. W,alling, supra; Cell vs. Drake, supra.
In this case we have no such attempt being made by
the grantor. Mrs. Schank never attempted to recall her
deeds. She remained steadfast to her fixed purpos·e of
maintaining the properties for the benefit of her favorite
and beloved niece.
We now refer to the argument of counsel that the
deeds in dispute were invalid because at the time they
were signed and acknowledged by Mrs. Schank the name
of the grantee was not written in.
Counsel has cit.ed and referred to cases holding that
a grantee is essential to the va:lidity of a deed. A grantor
may, however, sign and acknowledge a deed and thereafter insert the name of the grantee. Courts have held in
numerous cases that this may be done. In fact, the cases
have gone so far as to hold that a grantee's name may be
inserted after delivery of the instrument and after its
recording, and have even gone to the extent of holding
that if a grantor signs a deed in blank and delivers it
to a person, intending thereby 'to vest title in him, the
person receiving it is impliedly the agent of the grantor
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done, the deed is valid. In this case, this court need not
go to any such lengths to find the deeds here involved to
be valid. The undisputed evidence is that they were
complete when handed to Russell Eschler by Mrs.
Schank. The only permissible inference is that :Mrs.
Schank herself completed them or had some person do it
for her.
DEEDs CoMPLETE BEFORE DELIVERY

In Utah, so far as we have been able to determine,
there have been only two cases decided upon the question of deeds delivered in blank. One of those cases is
Beatty vs. Shelley, 42 Utah 592, 132 P. 1160. In that case
a grantor signed a deed and gave it to a trustee, with
the understanding that the name of a certain grantee
was to be inserted. The defendant wrongfully obtained
possession of the deed, and without the knowledge, consent or permission of plaintiff inserted his own name
as the grantee. It was certainly proper, in that case, for
this court to decide, which it did, that the deed conveyed
no title to the defendant.
And in Utah State Building ·and Loan Associatvon
vs. Perkins, 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950, the purported
grantor signed two blank deeds in which there was no
description, consideration or grantee named. These
deeds were subsequently completed by a grantee without the knowledge, consent or permission of the grantor.
It was held under these circumstances that the deeds
did not convey any title to the property described therein. by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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From other jurisdictions we have many cases involving the question of the delivery of deeds in blank. Thus
in Wright vs. Sconyers, Okla., 300 P. 672, the court held
that where a deed is left blank as to the grantee, and
delivered to a third party to fill in the name of the
grantee when his identity is established, the name of the
grantee may be inserted by anyone under the direction
of the person authorized to fill it in, and the deed is
then complete and good. The court cites the following
as the correct rule :
''The modern, and as we think, the better
rule, is that authority may be given by parol to
insert the name of the grantee in a deed, ,even
after delivery, and such authority may be implied
from the circumstances." (From Gutherie vs.
Field, Kan. 116 P. 217.)
And further :
"It will thus be seen that the tendency is to
uphold such deeds where the effect thereof is to
carry out the intention of the grantor.''
In Gilmore vs. Shearre.r, Iowa, 197 N.W. 631, Scott
and Shearer were made parties to a foreclosure suit
upon the theory that they had by contract assumed and
agreed to pay a mortgage. They were not named as
grantees in the deed, but had accepted a deed made out
in blank by the mortgagor. The name of the grantee
was inserted after they had accepted delivery of the
deed in blank. It was held that Scott and 'Shearer were
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deed was blank as to the name of the grantee. It was
held that they could not escape liability for covenants
in a deed by merely passing the deed on to a subsequent
grantee and filling in such grantee's name, leaving their
own names out of the instrument. The deed was held
to be valid and binding.
In Ba.rth ~t:s. Barth, Wash., 143 P. 2d 542, the court
had before it a deed in which the name of the grantee
was left blank. It was held in that case that the deed
was void. The court, however, says:
"A number of states have adopted the rule
that an authority subsequently to insert the
grantee's name in a deed must be in writing. In
this state, however, we have followed what we
think is the more reasonable rule, that a deed in
which the name of the grantee is left blank but
which is otherwise 'lawfully executed will vest title
in a person whose name is subsequently inserted
therein as grantee by one having authority from
the grantor so to do, and that in the absence of
any fraud such authority may ordinarily be inferred from the fact of possession of the deed by
the person who fills in such blank. * * *" (Citing
cases.)
And in Bryant vs. Barger, Ind., 42 N.E. 2d 429,
the court held that where a deed was made by a grantor
with the name of the gran tee left blank, which blank
was filled in before delivery to the grantee, the deed
was valid. The court pointed out that a deed before delivery is inoperative, whatever its condition of completeness may be, and if completed after it has been signed
it is for
valid.
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In Durbin vs. Bennett, Ill., 31 F. Supp. 24, the court
had before it the question of validity of two deeds conveying a one-half interest in certain oil rights. The evidence was conflicting as to whether the name of the
grantee and the description was inserted in the deeds
before the grantors executed them. However, both
grantors testified that they signed the deeds, intending
thereby to convey a one-half interest in the property
and expecting the deeds would be completed as to grantee
and the description by the agent to whom delivered.
Held that under Illinois law the deeds were valid, though
no grantee or description was inserted at the time of
delivery. The court stated:
''Illinois courts have been firm in their statement that in every grant there must be a grantee,
a grant and a thing granted and that omission of
any of these essentials invalidates :the transaction.
* * * But Illinois also recognizes the rule that if
the grantors ·execute and deliver deeds with the
understanding that there shall be inserted the
name of the grantee, the omission of the name is
not necessarily destructive of the conveyance. As
said in Sirois vs. Sirois, * * * 'the fact that the
grantee's name was in neither deed at the time
it was executed did not necessarily vitiate the
deeds, if the authority was given to insert the
name before de'livery,' and the burden of proof
is upon the grantor to prove fraud to avoid
validity. * * *"
In Chest(YI)Ut vs. Worley, Ok~a., 23 P. 2d 196, the
plaintiff had executed a deed to mineral rights in cerlands
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of effecting a sale of the land. The name of the grantee
was left blank. The defendant subsequently purchased
the mineral rights, paid for them, and was given the
deed, and defendant thereupon inserted his own name
as grantee. Plaintiff sought to set aside the de~d on
the ground that he had withdrawn the land from sale,
and the agent had no authority to make it, and that
plaintiff had not authorized a sale to the defendant or
the insertion of defendant's name as grantee. It was
held that the deed was valid. The fact that the defendant inserted his own name after the purchase at the
direction of plaintiff's agent was immaterial.
And in Strange vs. Maloney, Okla., 61 P. 2d 725,
the question was whether the defendant had assumed
a certain mortgage indebtedness upon property to which
he had a deed from the mortgagor in which the name
of the grantee was in blank. This deed was in defendant's possession. On the effect of leaving the name of
a grantee blank in a conveyance, the court said:
"In so far as the first assignment is concerned, it may be said that the general rule, amply
supported by authorities, holds that an instrument
purporting to be a deed in which a blank has been
left for the name of a grantee, is no deed and is
inoperative as a conveyance. * * * However, this
court has held that while a deed executed with the
name of the grantee left blank is defective and incomplete, yet if the name is inserted by the authority of the grantor, it may become valid and efSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
as aandconveyance.
* * *"
fectiv·e
Library Services
Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

56
And in Oalhown vs. D.rass, Penna., 179 Atlantic 568,
an attempt was made to set aside a deed on the ground
of preference. The question was raised as to the effect
of this deed, assuming it was a fact, having been executed with the name of the grantee blank. The court said:

'' * * * That a deed cannot exist as such without a grantee is fundamental, but the law controlling such instrument is vastly different from
that covering a deed without a grantee where
authority is given, to some one to insert 'the
gran tee's name. While there is a conflict of decisions as to whether that authority should be in
writing or whether it may be oral, ·express or
implied from the circumstances, a majority of
jurisdictions do not require written authority
to insert the grantee's name; Pennsylvania is one
of the oldest of that dass. An agent of the grantor
may insert the name of the grantee notwithstanding such direction is verbal and many states (citing Iowa, Washington, New York and Missouri)
recognize the doctrine of implied authority to
insert the name of the grantee in the blank space
left therefor. Our statute of frauds * * * would
seem not to require written authority to insert the
name of the grantee. * * *''

'' * * * A valid deed may be signed, acknowledged, and delivered with the name of the grantee
left blank, provided there is authority, oral or
written, express or implied, in some one to fill
in the blank. * * * ' '
And in Edmons1on vs. W.a~e1"st1on, Mo., 119 S.W.
2d 318, the court had before it a case involving a deed
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grantee had been inserted in the deed without the consent of the grantor. The court held the deed to be valid,
and discussed the effect of a deed signed in blank as
follows:

"* * * When a deed is executed and delivered in blank, with parol authority to fill the
blank with the name of the grantee, the grantee
whose name is afterwards, inserted takes a good
title. * * * And this is true though the blank be
filled in the absence of the grantor. * * *"
The case also cites Farmers Bank vs. Wo,rthington,
JHo., 46 S."\V. 745, as follows:
"In 18 C.J. p. 188 Sec. 77 * * * we find the
following: 'A deed executed in blank is, according to the great weight of authority, void. It has,
however, been decided that a deed signed in blank
but filled in when delivered is valid. * * *"
And in Holliday vs. Clark, another Missouri case,
110 S.W. 2d 1110, a grantor conveyed property by deed
to her son, which was to be held by him for her benefit.
The son immediately thereafter executed a deed to the
same property back to the grantor and delivered it, in
which no grantee was named. This deed was retained
by the grantor but was never completed. During her
last illness, the defendants obtained possession of the
deed without authority and the name of one of them
was inserted in the second deed after the grantor's
death. The deed was held to be invalid. In speaking
ofbythe
ofLibrary.
theFunding
grantor's
to grantor
Sponsored
the S.J.effect
Quinney Law
for digitization son
provideddelivering
by the Institute of Museum
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

58

a deed with the name of the grantee omitted, the court
said:
'' * * * Mrs. Holliday was at all times, at least,
the beneficial owner, with the equitable title; and
since she had a deed delivered to her with the
grantee's name left blank, it was certainly a
reasonable inference, and one which we hold, that
the court was warranted in making from the circumstances of the transaction; that she had
authority to complete this deed by filling in her
own name and thus becoming the lega'l owner.
***"
And in Gilbert vs. Plowmmn, Iowa, 256 N.W. 746,
the question of the validity of a deed executed and delivered by plaintiffs to the defendant pursuant to an
agreement of purchase in which the name of the grantees
was omitted from the deed was considered. The court
said:
"It has long been held in this State that
authority to a grantee to fill a blank in a deed is
implied when the grantor delivers the deed fully
executed in other respects. * * *''
And from Hall vs. Kary, Iowa, 110 N.W. 930:
"* **it must be presumed that although plaintiff's deed was blank as to grantee, the intention
was to vest Chamberlain with title to the property
described therein, and authorize him to insert
the name of a grantee as he should see fit. That
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing otherwise fully executed, vests title in the person whose name is subsequently insert.ed therein
bv the one to whom it is delivered as a conveyance
i~ well settled in this state. * * *"
, The court in that case then went on to state that
the statute of frauds did not apply or prevent evidence
of the transaction from being received. And finally, see
Tumansky vs. Woodruff, Calif., 57 P. 2d 1372, in which
the court said:

"* * * The escrow instructions, it will be recalled, specifically provided that the named
grantees would take the deeds in their own names
or in the name of their nominee. We believe ifuat,
since they accepted the deed in its blank form,
they received authority from the escrow agent to
insert the name of the grantee, and that the escrow
agent had the power to delegate this authority.
• * *"
The foregoing cases clearly hold that the omission
of the name of the grantee at the time of execution and
acknowledgment by a grantor is not fatal to the validity
of the instrument. The thing of importance is: What
is the condition of the deed at the time it is delivered~
If a completed instrument at that time, the deed in all
respects is entitled to the same weight and to the same
legal effect as though the name of the grantee had been
inserted at the time the grantor signed and acknowledged
it.
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TEsTAMENTARY DocuMENTS Do NOT AFFECT
RESPONDENT's TITLE

After this case had been filed in the court below, two
papers were found among the effects of Mrs. Schank at
her home on Second Avenue. One purported to be an olfographic will dated June 17, 1926 (Exhibit "P"). The
other was a separate document and bore no date and no
clue to the date of its execution (Exhibit "A"). Both
documents were offered for probate in the court having
jurisdiction of Mrs. Schank's estate. A hearing was had
at which the probate of both documents was protested.
The court admitted to probate the purported will of June
17, 1926, but rejected the undated and unindentified slip
of pa:per. Both the will and the undated paper were offered in evidence in the court below. Over objections by
respondent, both papers were received in evidence.
Neither the will nor the undated document can have
any significance in this case. It will be remembered that
the will is dated June 17, 1926. At that time Leta was
still a child, and Jennie Schank's husband, Louis Schank,
and her mother, Mrs. Burnham, still had many years to
live.
Louis died in 1936 and Mrs. Burnham in 1944.
There is no doubt that as early as 1926 Mrs.
Schank and her husband both were warmly attached to
Leta, but Mrs. Schank's purpose to leave substantial
property to Leta and thereby secure her financially did
not become fixed until after the death of Louis Schank
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By the time ~Irs. Schank made de'livery of the deeds
conveying the several parcels of land to Leta, ~fr. Schank
and ~Irs. Burnham were dead, and Leta was married and
her children had come along to liven the interest and
quicken the affection of Mrs. Schank. By that time,
furthermore, ~Irs. Schank had reached the avowed state
of mind toward at least one of the appellants of such
hostility as to exclude him from her property.
Certainly the will wholly fails to support any argument against the validity of the deeds, as delivered in
~larch of 1946, or against the finding of the court below
that :Jirs. Schank intended to give property to Leta.
Exhibit "A" was rejected for probate because,
among other reasons, it was undated and the time when
it was made was left only to speculation. It could have
been made before the will of 1926, or any time after up
until the death of ~Irs. Burnham in 1944. The only basis
for any justifiable conclusion with respect to when it
was made was that it was made while Mrs. Burnham was
still living. It refers to certain deeds, but there is nothing
in the instrument to justify the conclusion it referred to
the deeds involved in this case. It may have been made
shortly after the will of 1926. Such a guess is as good as
any other, as the fixing of any date must result from pure
guess.

It is clear upon the record, however, that Mrs.
Schank was not the owner of seven of the nine properties here involved until some years after the execution
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"F", "G", "H", and "I".) Exhibit "E" covers apiece
of property located on lower Second Avenue, the title to
which was conveyed to Jennie Burnham Schank in October of 1904. Exhibit "F" covers also a piece of propery located on lower Second Avenue, and it discloses that
this property was conveyed to Louis Schank and Jennie
B. Schank as tenants in common June 18, 1920, and was
thereafter conveyed by Louis Schank to Jennie B. Schank
August 13, 1931. An examination of Exhibits "B" to
''I'', exclusive of Exhibits '' E'' and '' F' ', discloses that
Mrs. Schank did not secure the title to any of the properties before 1931, and as to the property covered by
Exhibit '' F'' prior to 1931, Mrs. Schank was but the
owner of a one-half interest therein.
No contention was made in the court below, and none
can be made here that either Exhibits "A" or "P" had
any efficacy whatsoever to pass title to the properties involved in this case.
To support their argument that the deeds now under
review are invalid because the name of Leta Eschler was
not filled in as grantee at the time the deeds were signed,
appellants grasp two of this court's decisions and one
from California and another from Minnesota, none of
which supports their contention.
Appellants rely upon Utah State Building am;d Lo:am
Assooiation vs. Perkins, supra. The facts there are so
q.ifferent than those presently under review that the case
can not help appellants. In the cited case, Perkins and
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and acknowledgments, the deeds were blank In blank
form they were retained by Perkins in his own private
possession. \Vithout his knowledge or consent, they were
taken from the place where he kept his private papers
and the name of the grantee and the description filled in.
In speaking of the controlling facts in the case, this
court said:
"It is not contended by any witness that
Perkins was present at the time of the delivery,
or that he knew anything of the recording of the
deeds until sometime afterwards. N·either is it
contended by anyone that Perkins had directed,
instructed or authorized anyone to fill in the descriptions or the considerations in the blank
deeds.''
Contrast those facts with the ones now before the
court. Here the grantor delivered the deeds which she
had completed in every particular.
In N ils~on v. Bamilton, 53 Utah 594, 174 P. 624, this
court considered a deed in which the named grantee was
dead at the time of execution. This court ruled that the
deed conveyed nothing to the dead man's estate, because there was no grantee in existence at the time of
delivery. In the case now under review, deeds which were
fully completed, executed and acknowledged named the
grantee who was alive at the time of delivery.
From other jurisdictions appellants cite Trout v.
Taylor, 17 P. (2d) 761, ·(Cal.), and Allen v. Allen, 51 N.W.
473, (Minn.). The controlling facts in both of those cases
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In the California case, those who relied upon the deeds
defrauded an ancient woman into signing and acknowledging a deed. She thought when she signed and delivered
the deed that a certain corporation was named as grantee.
Unknown to her, no grantee was named in the deed. But
after the deed was delivered, the names of certain individuals were filled in as grantees, without the grantor's
knowledge or consent. Here the deeds were delivered by
the grantor with respondent named as grantee.
In the Minnesota case, the deed named no grantee
whatever. Parole evidence that one of the grantors in
the deed should have been named as grantee was held
not admissable. The case is clearly not in point.
PRooF EsTABLISHES DuE ExECUTION OF DEEDS
Appellants claim there is insufficient proof in the
record of the execution of the deeds. But they do not
deny that S. W. Dowse, who was in all respects a competent witness was sworn and testified upon the trial that
he was acquainted with Mrs. Schank, the grantee, and
that he saw her sign the deeds, and saw her acknowledge
the deeds before a notary public. No effort was made to
discredit Dowse's testimony. Dowse furnished all of the
proof of execution which the statute required. Appellants cite the case of Tarpey v. Deseret 8alt Oompatny, 5
Utah 205, 14 P. 338. That case eonstrued a statute which
was not in force at any time pertinent to the present inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing witnesses to deeds, but there was no such requirement in 1938; or at any time since then ..
In nlurray v. Beal, 23 Utah 548, 65 P. 726, this
court ruled that a purported corporate acknowledgment
to a deed was defective. Notwithstanding the absence of
an acknowledgment, the deed was held to be admissable,
and that ''as between the parties, and all persons who
had actual knowledge of it, a deed does not require
acknowledgment to render it valid.'' Neither T.arpey v.
Salt Company, nor Murray v. Beal is applicable in this
case.
In Was key v. Chambers, 56 L. Ed. 885, 224 U.S. 564,
the Supreme Court of the United States had before it
facts unlike those here involved. The owner of a mining
claim deeded a portion of it to one Chambers. Thereafter,
by agreement of the parties the deed was altered to
change the estate conveyed to a one-half interest. The
statute involved required two witnesses to qualify the
deed for recordation. Only one witness signed the deed,
and the court ruled that the deed was not qualified for
recordation. :Mrs. Schank's deed required no witnesses,
and no change was made in the deeds after their delivery.

Wood v. Wood, 87 Utah 394, 49 P. (2d) 416, confirms the rule that the court must give effect to the
grantor's intention. In the Wood case this court emphasized that Mrs. Wood had made neither an ''actual
or symbolical delivery" of the subject of the gift. Mrs.
Wood was alive and testified to her intentions, and was
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under review, it was made clear that Mrs. Schank intended to make the gift, and she made irrevocab'le delivery of the muniments of title pursuant to that intention.
In SiJngleton v. Kelly, supra, this court felt itself
bound by the findings and decisions of the trial court that
upon all of the ·evidence the grantor had never made delivery of the deed, but had on the contrary left written
instructions with the third person depository that he,
the grantor, should be at liberty to withdraw the deed at
such time as he might elect. It was not so with Mrs.
Schank. She made irrevocable delivery of fully completed
deeds, and when she did so she said, ''I am giving these
properties to Leta.''

Reed v. K "YY!Udson, supra, rules that delivery is a
matter of intention and intent is to be arrived at from
all of the facts and circumstances in evidence. All of the
facts and circumstances irresistibly led the trial court to
the conclusion that Jennie B. Schank intended to and
did make the gift to Leta B. Eschler, the one person
in the world upon whom her affection and interest was
focused. This court upheld the delivery in Reed v. K nudson, because the evidence there, just as it does here,
showed that when the grantor left the instrument of
grant with the third person, it was the grantor's intention to relinquish all further control of the instrument
and have it take effect at that time.
This court in Stanley v. Sti(Jffbley, supra, dealt with
facts far different than those in the case of Mrs. Schank.
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Stanley and his wife were estranged, and there was
hostility between them. The wife had invested the husband's savings over a long period in certain parcels of
land. They separated, and some of the property was
in the wife's name, but the piece involved in the case
was in his name. She was not the object of his affection
or solicitude. He held and kept the piece of property, not
for her benefit, but in antagonism to any claim she
might have. When he died, she filed an ancient will for
probate and listed the disputed property as belonging to
her husband's estate. Mrs. Schank, on the other hand,
delivered the deeds now under review pursuant to an
oft- repeated purpose to insure Leta's security. And
when she delivered the deeds, she expressed the desire and intention to look after and maintain the
property for Leta, because the property was not selfsustaining. Mrs. Schank's conduct and statements were
in full harmony with her purpose, as expressed at the
time of delivery, and in full harmony with respondent's
contentions. Irrevocable delivery of the deeds and subsequent care and preservation of the property by Mrs.
Schank were in harmony with the relationship which
existed between her and Leta from Leta's infancy to
the last day of Mrs. Schank's life.
RussELL EscHLER

A

CoMPETENT WITNESS

Russell Eschler married Leta in 1935. Before the
deeds had been delivered to him in March of 1946, he
had gained the confidence and respect of Mrs. Schank.
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cerned for his welfare, and because he conducted himself
as she had hoped he would, she liked him. But the gift of
properties was to Leta, and not to him. Any interest he
had in the transaction was in law, an indirect, as distinguished from a direct interest.
A husband who is devoted to his wife will naturally
be interested in her welfare. But this court has squarely
held that the interest of a husband as such does not disqualify him as a witness in litigation between his wife
and the estate of a deceased person.
OlstOn v. BeaU, supra, was a suit between Olive 'Scott
and the administrator of her mother's estate. If Olive
Scott sustained her daim, she would be the owner of two
bank deposits. If she failed the money would be part of
the estate. Olive's husband testified to statements made
by deceased that the money was Olive's. This court ruled
that he was "entirely competent" to so testify. Olson
v. Scott is the law of this state so far as our research has
disclosed, and is a complete answer to appellants' contention.

Appellants cite Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228
P. 911. This court in that case reaffirmed its ruling in
Olson v. Soott, supra, that ''a husband was entirely competent to testify'' in behalf of his wife in such a case
as this. Appellants would create an exception to the wellsettled rule in order to support their contention that
there is something in the case we are now presenting
which takes it out of the general rule. They say that if
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taxes and expenses thereof, a burden would have fallen
upon Russell Eschler, and that therefore Russell Eschler
acquired a direct interest in the result of the lawsuit. But
Russell's interest in the matter was indirect, as was that
of the husband in Olson v. Soott, supra, and as was that
of the children in M ou:er v. Mower, supra. Russe'll could
have paid the taxes, or not as he might elect, or Leta
could have sold such part of the property as was nonproductive.

In re Fan .Alstime's Est.ate, 26 Utah 193, 72 P. 942,
is relied upon by appellants. The case supports the position of respondent. It was urged in the Van Alstine case
that the guardian ad litem of minor protestants was incompetent, because in the event of her failure to successfully prosecute the action she might be chargeable with
court costs. Any interest she might have had was like
Russell Eschler 's, an indirect interest.
There is a strange angle to appellants' contention
that Russell Eschler had an interest which rendered him
incompetent. They say he might have been burdened by
the payment of taxes if Mrs. Schank had not assumed
that burden. In the first place, Mrs. Schank did assume
the burden of the taxes. In the second place, if Russell
Eschler acquired an interest based upon the possibility
of his acquiring a tax burden, then his interest would
have aligned him against the interest of his wife.
Finally, upon the subject of Russell Eschler's incompetency, appellants cite ]}f.axfield v. Sa.insbury, 110
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ence to Mr. Justice Wolfe's learned article upon the
"dead man's statute." Nothing in that case detracts
from the ruling of Olson v. Scott, supra, and Mower v.
Mower, supra, that a husband, not ·a party to the action,
is "entirely competent," to testify in behalf of his wife,
who is a party to the action, concerning conversations
had with the deceased.
A person not a party to the action is not incompetent
by force of the statute unless he has a" direct" interest
adverse to the estate. The word ''direct'' can not be writ.
ten· out of the statute, and this court has unequivocally
ruled that a husband related to the case, ~s Russell Esch~
ler is related to the case now under review, does not have
a ''direct'' interest, such as to disqualify him.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Schank's life was ended suddenly and without
warning on the evening of March 30, 1947. Up until that
very day her interest and devotion had been so focused
upon her niece Leta that those familiar with the relationship might well have expected her to leave all of
her property of every kind to Leta. Apparently, she had
not got around to the disposition of her entire estate.
But she had completed gifts to Leta of the parcels of
land involved in this case.
As in all such cases, it is the concern of the courts
to discover the true intention of the grantor and to give
effect to that intention, unless there is some insuperable
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the grantor is in all respects clear. She intended to provide security for Leta and her children. That she executed the deeds-signed and acknowledged them-in the
presence of S. W. Dowse was proven without conflict.
That she completed the deeds by supplying the name of
Leta as grantee, and thereafter delivered them unconditionally to Russell Eschler for Leta was likewise proved
without conflict.
Mrs. Schank's continued management of the property, including collection of rentals, payment of taxes
and insurance, was not inconsistent with the gift, but
was in confirmation of it. She made the gift to Leta for
Leta's future security and continued in control of the
property only to protect the gift and fortify its purpose.
As it is, substantial property will pass from Mrs.
Schank to persons who were not embraced within her
affections, and who were not the objects of her bounty. To
strike down the gift of property to Leta would completely
frustrate the long fixed and clearly expressed purpose
and intention of the grantor.

It is respectfully submitted that upon the facts and
the law, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
Attorneys for Respondent
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